Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chernenko, Sergey; Lerner, Josh; Zeng, Yao
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaa100
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2362
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTOR FLOWS; performance; certification; DIRECTORS; COSTS

摘要

Founder-friendly venture financings and nontraditional venture investors have both flourished over the past decade. Using detailed contract data, we study open-end mutual funds investing in private venture-backed firms. We posit that conflicts between early-stage venture investors and liquidity-constrained later-stage ones influence the classic agency problems affecting entrepreneurs and investors. We find that mutual funds with more stable funding are more likely to invest in private firms and that financing rounds with mutual fund participation have stronger redemption, stronger IPO-related rights, and less board representation. These findings are consistent with our conceptual framework.