CEO Noncompete Agreements, Job Risk, and Compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kini, Omesh; Williams, Ryan; Yin, Sirui
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Arizona; University System of Ohio; Miami University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaa103
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 4701
• 关键词: SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION; executive-compensation; TRADE SECRETS; CONTRACTS; covenants; performance; incentives; DIRECTORS

摘要

Using hand-collected data on CEO noncompete agreements (NCAs), we find that NCAs are less common when CEOs expect to incur greater personal costs from reduced job mobility and more common when firms expect to suffer greater economic harm if departing CEOs leave to work for a competitor. Additionally, turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger when CEOs have NCAs. Finally, total compensation and incentive pay are higher if CEOs have more enforceable NCAs. Our identification strategy exploits staggered state-level changes in NCA enforceability. Overall, our findings suggest that restrictions on job mobility have important implications for how CEOs are monitored and compensated.