The Effect of Bank Supervision and Examination on Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kandrac, John; Schlusche, Bernd
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/hhaa090
发表日期：
2021
页码：
3181
关键词：
摘要：
We exploit an exogenous reduction in bank supervision and examination to demonstrate a causal effect of supervisory oversight on financial institutions' risk taking. The additional risk took the form of risky lending, faster asset growth, and a greater reliance on low-quality capital. This response to less oversight boosted banks' odds of failure. Lastly, we show that the reduction in oversight capacity led to more costly failures because there were longer delays in closing insolvent institutions, and because more bad assets were passed to the government insurance fund.