Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Darmouni, Olivier; Sutherland, Andrew
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaa109
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2275
• 关键词: LEVEL EVIDENCE; stock-prices; INFORMATION; incentives; INVESTMENT; frictions; POLICY

摘要

We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors' contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders' common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information-sharing platform. Upon entering, lenders adjust their contract terms toward what others offer. This reaction is mediated by the distribution of market shares: lenders with higher shares or that operate in concentrated markets react less. Thus, contract terms are shaped not only by borrower or lender fundamentals but also by the interaction between information availability and competition.