Fintech Borrowers: Lax Screening or Cream-Skimming?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Maggio, Marco; Yao, Vincent
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaa142
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 4565
• 关键词: competition; FAILURE

摘要

We study the personal credit market using unique individual-level data covering fintech and traditional lenders. We show that fintech lenders acquire market share by lending first to higher-risk borrowers and then to safer borrowers, and rely mainly on hard information to make credit decisions. Fintech borrowers are significantly more likely to default than neighbor individuals with the same characteristics borrowing from traditional financial institutions. Furthermore, they tend to experience a short-lived reduction in the cost of credit, because their indebtedness increases more than non-fintech borrowers after loan origination. However, fintech lenders' pricing strategies are likely to take this into account.