Weak Governance by Informed Active Shareholders
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Goldman, Eitan; Wang, Wenyu
署名单位：
Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/hhaa052
发表日期：
2021
页码：
661
关键词：
摘要：
Do informed shareholders who can influence corporate decisions improve governance? We demonstrate this may not be generally true in a model of takeovers. The model suggests that a shareholder's ability to collect information and trade ex post may cause him, ex ante, to support pursuing value-destroying takeovers or oppose value-enhancing takeovers. Surprisingly, we find conditions under which giving the active shareholder greater influence weakens governance and reduces firm value, even if such influence power can be used to reject bad takeovers ex post. Our model sheds light on the limitations of relying on informed, active shareholders to improve governance.
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