Shareholder Perks and Firm Value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karpoff, Jonathan M.; Schonlau, Robert; Suzuki, Katsushi
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Colorado State University System; Colorado State University Fort Collins; Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaa141
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 5676
• 关键词: INVESTOR RECOGNITION; corporate governance; propensity score; MARKET-SEGMENTATION; DIVIDEND CHANGES; STOCK LIQUIDITY; cross-section; asset prices; risk-taking; OWNERSHIP

摘要

Shareholder perks are in-kind gifts or purchase discounts that disproportionately reward small shareholders. Data from Japanese firms indicate that firms initiating perk programs attract individual retail shareholders and experience increases in share values. We find support for three channels by which perks increase firm value: an increase in share liquidity, a decrease in the equity cost of capital, and signaling to investors. A fourth channel, by which perks help to market the firm's products to consumers, receives mixed support. We do not find evidence that perk programs work to entrench managers.