The Party Structure of Mutual Funds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bubb, Ryan; Catan, Emiliano M.
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhab082
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2839
• 关键词: corporate; TIES

摘要

We investigate the structure of mutual funds' corporate governance preferences as revealed by how they vote their shares in portfolio companies. We apply unsupervised learning tools from the machine learning literature to analyze mutual funds' votes and find that a parsimonious two-dimensional model can explain the bulk of mutual fund voting. The dimensions capture competing visions of corporate governance and are related to the leading proxy advisors' recommendations. Cluster analysis shows that mutual funds are organized into three parties-the Traditional Governance Party, Shareholder Reform Party, and Shareholder Protest Party-that follow distinctive philosophies of corporate governance and shareholders' role.