When Shareholders Disagree: Trading after Shareholder Meetings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Sophia Zhengzi; Maug, Ernst; Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Newark; University of Mannheim; European Corporate Governance Institute; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhab059
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1813
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Mutual funds; DIFFERENTIAL INTERPRETATION; NEWS EVIDENCE; MARKET; opinion; INFORMATION; diversity; volume; speculation

摘要

This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks on the meeting date, and remains high up to four weeks after shareholder meetings. The results support models based on differences of opinion that predict that shareholders' beliefs may diverge more after observing voting outcomes. Hence, trading after meetings creates a more homogeneous shareholder base, which has important implications for corporate governance.