Persistent Blessings of Luck: Theory and an Application to Venture Capital

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cong, Lin William; Xiao, Yizhou
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhab049
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1183
• 关键词: PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE; Fund flows; MARKET; COMPENSATION; pay; incentives; CONTRACTS; networks; returns; smart

摘要

Persistent performance in venture capital is routinely interpreted as evidence for skill. We present a dynamic model of delegated investment with endogenous fund heterogeneity and deal flow, which generates performance persistence without skill differences and predicts mean reversion in long-term performance. Investors working with multiple funds use contingent payments and tiered contracts to induce proper project nurturing and managerial effort. Successful funds receive continuation contracts that tolerate investment failure and encourage innovation, and subsequently finance entrepreneurs through a path-dependent assortative matching favoring incumbents. Recent empirical findings corroborate the model's general implications, and the economic mechanisms are robust to short-term contracting, endogenous bargaining, and double moral hazard issues.