Activism and Takeovers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burkart, Mike; Lee, Samuel
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Swedish House of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; Santa Clara University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhab039
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1868
• 关键词: HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM; PRIVATE EQUITY; corporate governance; large shareholders; AGENCY COSTS; EFFICIENCY; OWNERSHIP; BEHAVIOR; MARKET; rules

摘要

We compare activism and takeovers from the perspective of a blockholder who can provide effort to improve firm value. We show that free-riding behavior by dispersed shareholders has the following implications: First, activism can be more profitable than a hostile takeover even if it is less efficient. Second, activism is most efficient when it brokers, rather than substitutes for, takeovers. Third, such takeover activism earns superior returns. More broadly, our theory implies that activists specialize in governance reforms with limited, temporary ownership being a strength rather than a shortcoming of activism.