Group-Managed Real Options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garlappi, Lorenzo; Giammarino, Ron; Lazrak, Ali
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhab100
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 4105
• 关键词: CORPORATE-INVESTMENT; decision-making; CHOICE; COMMUNICATION; DISAGREEMENT; equilibrium; CONTRACTS; diversity; BEHAVIOR; opinion

摘要

We study a standard real-option problem in which sequential decisions are made through voting by a group of members with heterogeneous beliefs. We show that, when facing both investment and abandonment timing decisions, the group behavior cannot be replicated by that of a representative median member. As a result, members' disagreement generates inertia-the group delays investment relative to a single-agent case-and underinvestment-the group rejects projects that are supported by a majority of members, acting in autarky. These coordination frictions hold in groups of any size, for general voting protocols, and are exacerbated by belief polarization.