Quick or Broad Patents? Evidence from US Startups

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hegde, Deepak; Ljungqvist, Alexander; Raj, Manav
• 署名单位: New York University; Stockholm School of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Swedish House of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhab097
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2705
• 关键词: intellectual property-rights; research-and-development; INNOVATION EVIDENCE; SCOPE; PROTECTION; QUALITY; POLICY

摘要

We study the effects of patent scope and review times on startups and externalities on their rivals. We leverage the quasi-random assignment of U.S. patent applications to examiners and find that grant delays reduce a startup's employment and sales growth, chances of survival, access to external capital, and future innovation. Delays also harm the growth, access to external capital, and follow-on innovation of the patentee's rivals, suggesting that quick patents enhance both inventor rewards and generate positive externalities. Broader scope increases a startup's future growth (conditional on survival) and innovation but imposes negative externalities on its rivals' growth and innovation.