Import Penetration and Executive Compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lie, Erik; Yang, Keyang (Daniel)
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; Washington State University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac020
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 281
• 关键词: product market competition; managerial incentives; TOURNAMENT INCENTIVES; corporate governance; firm; performance; RISK; pay; adjustment; regression

摘要

We first compare several measures of import penetration and find that total imports, tariffs, and exchange rates are endogenous, while imports from China are largely exogenous. Then we examine the effects of Chinese import penetration on executive compensation of U.S. firms. We document that Chinese import penetration reduces executives' stock grants and wealth-performance sensitivity, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms. Authors have furnished an , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.