Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Faccio, Mara; Zingales, Luigi
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; National Bureau of Economic Research; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Chicago; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhab074
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1983
• 关键词: Privatization; connections; inference

摘要

We study the relationship between the presence of politicians on mobile service operators' boards and the regulation of the mobile telecommunication sector. In countries in which mobile operators have deeper connections with local politicians, we find that rules promote competition less, even after we control for country fixed effects and a country's level of corruption. Rules that promote competition are associated with lower concentration and lower prices. There is no evidence that procompetition rules are associated with worse quality, lower investments, less employment, or lower wages. Thus, all the evidence points to political connections being a form of rent-seeking.