When FinTech Competes for Payment Flows

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Parlour, Christine A.; Rajan, Uday; Zhu, Haoxiang
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac022
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 4985
• 关键词: DISRUPTION; incentives

摘要

We study the impact of FinTech competition in payment services when a monopolist bank uses payment data to learn about consumers' credit quality. Competition from FinTech payment providers disrupts this information spillover. The bank's price for payment services and its loan offers are affected. FinTech competition promotes financial inclusion, may hurt consumers with a strong bank preference, and has an ambiguous effect on the loan market. Both FinTech data sales and consumer data portability increase bank lending, but the effects on consumer welfare are ambiguous. Under mild conditions, consumer welfare is higher under data sales than with data portability.