Simultaneous Multilateral Search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Glebkin, Sergei; Yueshen, Bart Zhou; Shen, Ji
• 署名单位: INSEAD Business School; INSEAD Business School; Peking University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac009
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 571
• 关键词: large numbers; EXACT LAW; liquidity; equilibrium; TRANSPARENCY; price; COSTS

摘要

This paper studies simultaneous multilateral search (SMS) in over-the-counter markets: When searching, a customer simultaneously contacts several dealers and trades with the one offering the best quote. Higher search intensity (how often one can search) improves welfare, but higher search capacity (how many dealers one can contact) might be harmful. When the market is in distress, customers might inefficiently favor bilateral bargaining (BB) over SMS. Such a preference for BB speaks to the sluggish adoption of SMS trading, like request-for-quote protocols, in over-the-counter markets. Furthermore, a market-wide shift to SMS may not be socially optimal.