Do Corporate Disclosures Constrain Strategic Analyst Behavior?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chang, Yen-Cheng; Ljungqvist, Alexander; Tseng, Kevin
• 署名单位: National Taiwan University; Swedish House of Finance; Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad008
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 3163
• 关键词: EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY; information acquisition; investment banking; Market reaction; career concerns; cross-section; REGULATION FD; OF-INTEREST; recommendations; reputation

摘要

We show that analyst behavior changes in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce coverage and issue less optimistic, more accurate, less bold, and less informative forecasts. Our evidence indicates that analysts reduce a strategic component of their behavior: the changes are stronger among analysts with more strategic incentives like affiliated or retail-focused analysts. We conclude that mandatory disclosure can substitute for analyst information production, which is constrained by investors' ability to verify forecasts using corporate filings.