Macroprudential Policy with Liquidity Panics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garcia-Macia, Daniel; Villacorta, Alonso
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac071
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2046
• 关键词: Bank runs; cash; INVESTMENT

摘要

We study the optimality of macroprudential policies in an environment where banks provide liquidity to firms. Informational frictions between banks can cause interbank market freezes, prompting firms to accumulate their own liquid assets. Liquidity hoarding by firms in turn reduces the demand for bank loans and bank profitability, makes interbank market freezes even more likely, and may ultimately trigger a self-fulfilling bad equilibrium. Such liquidity panics provide an additional rationale for liquidity requirements on banks, which alleviate frictions in the banking sector and, paradoxically, can increase aggregate investment. Instead, policies encouraging bank lending can have the opposite effect.