From Market Making to Matchmaking: Does Bank Regulation Harm Market Liquidity?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saar, Gideon; Sun, Jian; Yang, Ron; Zhu, Haoxiang
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Singapore Management University; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac068
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 678
• 关键词: competition

摘要

Postcrisis bank regulations raised market-making costs for bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market-making costs change the market structure by intensifying competitive pressure from nonbank dealers and incentivizing bank dealers to shift their business activities toward matchmaking. Thus, postcrisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing costly bank balance sheets with a more efficient form of financial intermediation.