Common Venture Capital Investors and Startup Growth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eldar, Ofer; Grennan, Jillian
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; European Corporate Governance Institute
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad071
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 549
• 关键词: product market competition; corporate governance; empirical-analysis; cross-ownership; INVESTMENT; IMPACT; boards; INFORMATION; networking; expertise

摘要

We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios.Authors have furnished an , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.