Short Campaigns by Hedge Funds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Appel, Ian; Fos, Vyacheslav
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; Boston College; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad092
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1460
• 关键词: SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; SHORT SELLERS; corporate governance; VALUE CREATION; returns; turnover

摘要

The number of short campaigns by hedge funds has dramatically increased over the last two decades. Nearly 80% of campaigns are undertaken by activist hedge funds, particularly those that employ hostile tactics in their long campaigns. Short campaigns are associated with negative abnormal returns of -7%, with aggregate valuation effects similar in magnitude to the gains from long activism campaigns. In contrast to long campaigns, public communication is a critical component of short campaigns. We do not find evidence that such communication is manipulative. Overall, our analysis highlights the importance of short campaigns for understanding the economic impact of activist hedge funds.Authors have furnished an , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.