Committee-Based Blockchains as Games between Opportunistic Players and Adversaries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley; Biais, Bruno; Potop-Butucaru, Maria; Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara
• 署名单位: Universite Paris Saclay; CEA; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Sorbonne Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad051
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 409
• 关键词: information; aggregation; rationality; ELECTIONS; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We study consensus in a protocol capturing in a simplified manner the major features of the majority of Proof of Stake blockchains. A committee is formed; one member proposes a block; and the others can check its validity and vote for it. Blocks with a majority of votes are produced. When an invalid block is produced, the stakes of the members who voted for it are slashed. Profit-maximizing members interact with adversaries seeking to disrupt consensus. When slashing is limited, free-riding and moral-hazard lead to invalid blocks in equilibrium. We propose a protocol modification producing only valid blocks in equilibrium. Authors have furnished an , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.