Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blickle, Kristian; Brunnermeier, Markus; Luck, Stephan
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhae020
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2685
• 关键词: german twin crisis; MARKET DISCIPLINE; Deposit insurance; financial fragility; liquidity risk; runs; panics; contagion; DEPRESSION; distress

摘要

We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress.