Shareholder Monitoring through Voting: New Evidence from Proxy Contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brav, Alon; Jiang, Wei; Li, Tao; Pinnington, James
• 署名单位: Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Emory University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Duke University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad066
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 591
• 关键词: HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM; corporate governance; Mutual funds; BUSINESS TIES; WALL-STREET; INDEX FUNDS; PROPOSALS; securities; investors; VOTE

摘要

We present the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Among contests where voting takes place, passive funds are 10 percentage points less likely than active funds to vote for dissidents. The gap shrinks significantly when accounting for votes withheld from management nominees, settled contests, and votes by non-Big-Three fund families. Passive and active funds are equally informed about firm fundamentals, although passive funds view contest-related SEC filings more often than active funds during contests, in absolute levels and incrementally relative to noncontest periods. We conclude that passive funds are engaged shareholders in high-stakes voting events.Authors have furnished an , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online