Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acharya, Viral V.; Parlatore, Cecilia; Sundaresan, Suresh
• 署名单位: New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf007
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1368
• 关键词: sovereign debt; default risk; moral hazard; simple-model; CONTRACTS; INVESTMENT; allocation; CORRUPTION; GROWTH; AGENCY

摘要

We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit expropriation. This double moral hazard limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing contracts involve government guarantees to investors against project failure to incentivize the government to agree not to expropriate, thus improving private sector incentives and project quality. The contract also reflects several other features prevalent in infrastructure financing in practice, among which are government coinvestment, tax subsidies, and development rights.