The Shadow Cost of Collateral

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pan, Guangqian; Pan, Zheyao; Xiao, Kairong
• 署名单位: University of Sydney; Macquarie University; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhae073
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1419
• 关键词: credit; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; access; POLICY; LAWS

摘要

We quantify the cost of pledging collateral for small businesses by exploiting a regulatoryquirk of the SBA disaster lending program in which firms are exempt from posting collateralif their loan size is below a threshold. Firms bunch their loans below the threshold,and the resultant distortion in the loan size distribution reveals the magnitude of thecollateral cost. The collateral cost is substantial and varies across collateral types, businesssectors, and collateral laws in ways consistent with flexibility-based theories. Our findingshave implications for firms' borrowing constraints and disaster lending program designs