Short-Term Debt and Corporate Governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Voss, Paul
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf018
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1868
• 关键词: institutional investors; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; Ownership structure; liquidity; INVESTMENT; INFORMATION; firm; EFFICIENCY; liability; COSTS

摘要

According to existing theories, short-term creditors promote corporate governance by responding quickly to new information. I show that this very feature of short-term debt can also undermine corporate governance. Though moderate levels of short-term debt improve the efficacy of blockholder exit and increase blockholders' incentives to engage with the firm, high levels of short-term debt impair governance. In particular, high levels of short-term debt render the threat of exit noncredible, make public engagements too risky, and undermine blockholders' incentives to engage behind the scenes. I identify a challenge in the governance of firms that rely on short-term funding such as banks.