EVOLUTIONARY SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: RITZBERGER, K; WEIBULL, JW
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.2307/2171774
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 1371-1399
• 关键词: STRATEGIC STABILITY; STABLE EQUILIBRIA; DYNAMICS; induction

摘要

This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces which are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and we show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria, and hence a strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).