Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Tirole, J
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00052
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 741-781
• 关键词: organizational form; implicit contracts; AGENT RELATIONSHIP; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; moral hazard; firm; RENEGOTIATION; principal; MARKET; COSTS

摘要

The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete contracts; in particular it discusses a tension between two assumptions made in the literature, namely rationality and the existence of transaction costs. Last, it argues that, contrary to what is commonly argued, the complete contract methodology need not be unable to account for standard institutions such as authority and ownership; and it concludes with a discussion of the research agenda.