Efficient design with interdependent valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00240
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1237-1259
• 关键词: Mechanism design; auctions

摘要

We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If signals are multi-dimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, and it can hold only in nongeneric cases where values are private or a certain symmetry assumption holds. If signals are one-dimensional, the congruence condition reduces to a monotonicity constraint and it can be generically satisfied. We apply the results to the study of multi-object auctions, and we discuss why such auctions cannot be reduced to one-dimensional models without loss of generality.