Games played through agents
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Prat, A; Rustichini, A
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
刊物名称：
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN/ISSBN：
0012-9682
DOI：
10.1111/1468-0262.00437
发表日期：
2003
页码：
989-1026
关键词：
摘要：
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria and we provide conditions-in terms of game balancedness-for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.
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