Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cripps, MW; Mailath, GJ; Samuelson, L
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00496.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 407-432
• 关键词: 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES; incomplete information; folk theorem; equilibria

摘要

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.