The organization of supplier networks: Effects of delegation and intermediation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mookherjee, D; Tsumagari, M
• 署名单位: Boston University; Keio University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00529.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1179-1219
• 关键词: Mechanism design; collusion; decentralization; incentives; INFORMATION; authority; COSTS

摘要

In a one-principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal's interest if the agents supply substitutes. It can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed.