Random matching under dichotomous preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bogomolnaia, A; Moulin, H
• 署名单位: Rice University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 257-279
• 关键词: Indivisible goods; allocation; assignment

摘要

We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants is a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate across all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is group-strategyproof for each side of the market. Our results apply to the random assignment problem as well.