Efficient use of information and social value of information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00783.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1103-1142
• 关键词: rational-expectations; TRANSPARENCY; COORDINATION; cournot; PRIVATE; rules

摘要

This paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies (games) that have externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and heterogeneous information. First, we characterize the equilibrium use of information: complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information, raising aggregate volatility, whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information, raising cross-sectional dispersion. Next, we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective; the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents. Finally, we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure; the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency, if any, in the equilibrium use of information. We conclude with a few applications, including production externalities, beauty contests, business cycles, and large Cournot and Bertrand games.