SOCIAL IMAGE AND THE 50-50 NORM: A THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF AUDIENCE EFFECTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andreoni, James; Bernheim, B. Douglas
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA7384
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1607-1636
• 关键词: Incomplete information; impure altruism; signaling games; ultimatum games; fairness; explanation; dominance; BEHAVIOR; equity

摘要

A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments. both In the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game). many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider :in alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to lie perceived its fair The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments