When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carroll, Gabriel
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA9454
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 661-686
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; schemes; MONOTONICITY; manipulation; preferences; division; monopoly; DESIGN; rules

摘要

We study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings, allowing for probabilistic mechanisms. We give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces. On many common preference domainsincluding any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences, single-peaked ordinal preferences, and successive single-crossing ordinal preferenceslocal incentive compatibility (suitably defined) implies full incentive compatibility. On domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition, local incentive compatibility is not sufficient. Our sufficiency results hold for dominant-strategy and Bayesian Nash solution concepts, and allow for some interdependence in preferences.