Continuous Implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oury, Marion; Tercieux, Olivier
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite; Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA8577
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1605-1637
• 关键词: STRUCTURE THEOREM; rationalizability; equilibrium

摘要

In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specifically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable if it is (partially) implementable for types in the model under study and it continues to be (partially) implementable for types close to this initial model. Our results show that this notion is tightly connected to full implementation in rationalizable strategies.