STABLE MATCHING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Qingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Pennsylvania; Yale University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11183
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 541-587
• 关键词: RANDOM-PATHS; STABILITY; equilibrium; investments; efficient; core

摘要

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete-information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete-information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient conditions for incomplete-information stable matchings to be efficient. Lastly, we define a notion of price-sustainable allocations and show that the set of incomplete-information stable matchings is a subset of the set of such allocations.