EXPERIMENTAL GAMES ON NETWORKS: UNDERPINNINGS OF BEHAVIOR AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.; Sutter, Matthias
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Trieste; Universidad de Malaga; European University Institute; University of Innsbruck; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11781
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1615-1670
• 关键词: local interaction; social networks; labor-market; COORDINATION; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; preferences; COMPETITION; EMPLOYMENT; STABILITY

摘要

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability, this framework applies to a wide variety of settings. We examine behavior and equilibrium selection. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique; when there are multiple equilibria, general features of networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs (social efficiency), but there are forces that moderate this attraction: (1) people seem content with (in the aggregate) capturing only the lion's share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss, and (2) uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information.