Information in Tender Offers With a Large Shareholder

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ekmekci, Mehmet; Kos, Nenad
• 署名单位: Boston College; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11059
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 87-139
• 关键词: FREE-RIDER PROBLEM; corporate-control; takeovers; acquisition; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We study takeovers of firms whose ownership structure is a mixture of minority block-holders and small shareholders. We show that the combination of dispersed private information on the side of small shareholders and the presence of a large shareholder can facilitate profitable takeovers. Furthermore, our analysis implies that even if some model of takeovers predicts a profit for the raider, for example, due to private benefits, the profit will be underestimated unless the large shareholder and the dispersion of information among the small shareholders are modeled.