Backward Induction Foundations of the Shapley Value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McQuillin, Ben; Sugden, Robert
• 署名单位: University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13191
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2265-2280
• 关键词: Efficiency; agreement

摘要

We present a noncooperative game model of coalitional bargaining, closely based on that of Gul (1989) but solvable by backward induction. In this game, Gul's condition of value additivity does not suffice to ensure the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that supports the Shapley value, but a related conditionno positive value-externalitiesdoes. Multiple equilibria can arise only in the event of ties, and with a mild restriction on tie-break rules these equilibria all support the Shapley value.