Large Contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11696
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 835-854
• 关键词: All-pay auction; asymmetric contests; price-competition; caps; INFORMATION; COSTS; games

摘要

We consider contests with many, possibly heterogeneous, players and prizes, and show that the equilibrium outcomes of such contests are approximated by the outcomes of mechanisms that implement the assortative allocation in an environment with a single agent that has a continuum of possible types. This makes it possible to easily approximate the equilibria of contests whose exact equilibrium characterization is complicated, as well as the equilibria of contests for which there is no existing equilibrium characterization.