Search With Adverse Selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA9969
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 243-315
• 关键词: Information percolation; MARKET; MODEL; aggregation; uncertainty; lemons; price

摘要

This paper analyzes a sequential search model with adverse selection. We study information aggregation by the pricehow close the equilibrium prices are to the full-information priceswhen search frictions are small. We identify circumstances under which prices fail to aggregate information well even when search frictions are small. We trace this to a strong form of the winner's curse that is present in the sequential search model. The failure of information aggregation may result in inefficient allocations.