THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE KUBA KINGDOM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lowes, Sara; Nunn, Nathan; Robinson, James A.; Weigel, Jonathan L.
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Harvard University; University of Chicago; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14139
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1065-1091
• 关键词: africa; origins; transmission; COOPERATION; preferences; incentives; motivation; CORRUPTION; Europe

摘要

We use variation in historical state centralization to examine the long-term impact of institutions on cultural norms. The Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the early 17th century by King Shyaam, had more developed state institutions than the other independent villages and chieftaincies in the region. It had an unwritten constitution, separation of political powers, a judicial system with courts and juries, a police force, a military, taxation, and significant public goods provision. Comparing individuals from the Kuba Kingdom to those from just outside the Kingdom, we find that centralized formal institutions are associated with weaker norms of rule following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain. This finding is consistent with recent models where endogenous investments to inculcate values in children decline when there is an increase in the effectiveness of formal institutions that enforce socially desirable behavior. Consistent with such a mechanism, we find that Kuba parents believe it is less important to teach children values related to rule-following behaviors.