The Efficiency of Slacking off: Evidence From the Emergency Department

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chan, David C.
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13565
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 997-1030
• 关键词: Incentives; work; ORGANIZATION; INFORMATION; motivation; CONTRACTS; ECONOMICS; cost; BIAS

摘要

Work schedules play an important role in utilizing labor in organizations. In this study of emergency department physicians in shift work, schedules induce two distortions: First, physicians slack off by accepting fewer patients near end of shift (EOS). Second, physicians distort patient care, incurring higher costs as they spend less time on patients assigned near EOS. Examining how these effects change with shift overlap reveals a tradeoff between the two. Within an hour after the normal time of work completion, physicians are willing to spend hospital resources more than six times their market wage to preserve their leisure. Accounting for overall costs, I find that physicians slack off at approximately second-best optimal levels.