The Implementation Duality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Noeldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry
• 署名单位: University of Basel; Yale University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13307
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1283-1324
• 关键词: principal-agent problems; adverse selection; Matching models; EXISTENCE; INFORMATION; core; mechanisms; marriage; taxation; MARKET

摘要

Conjugate duality relationships are pervasive in matching and implementation problems and provide much of the structure essential for characterizing stable matches and implementable allocations in models with quasilinear (or transferable) utility. In the absence of quasilinearity, a more abstract duality relationship, known as a Galois connection, takes the role of (generalized) conjugate duality. While weaker, this duality relationship still induces substantial structure. We show that this structure can be used to extend existing results for, and gain new insights into, adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems without quasilinearity.