Time Preferences and Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
• 署名单位: Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14396
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 173-217
• 关键词: perfect equilibrium; Complete information; repeated games; inconsistency; MODEL; delay; Consistency; CHOICE; uncertainty; COMMITMENT

摘要

This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium outcomes for any given preference profile, and (ii) the set of preference profiles for which equilibrium is unique. Based on this characterization, I establish that a weak notion of present biasimplied, for example, by any hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discountingis sufficient for equilibrium to be unique, stationary, and efficient. Conversely, I demonstrate how certain violations of present bias give rise to multiple (non-stationary) equilibria that feature delayed agreement under gradually increasing offers.