Targeting Interventions in Networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Galeotti, Andrea; Golub, Benjamin; Goyal, Sanjeev
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; Harvard University; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16173
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2445-2471
• 关键词: public-goods; social value; EIGENVALUE

摘要

We study games in which a network mediates strategic spillovers and externalities among the players. How does a planner optimally target interventions that change individuals' private returns to investment? We analyze this question by decomposing any intervention into orthogonal principal components, which are determined by the network and are ordered according to their associated eigenvalues. There is a close connection between the nature of spillovers and the representation of various principal components in the optimal intervention. In games of strategic complements (substitutes), interventions place more weight on the top (bottom) principal components, which reflect more global (local) network structure. For large budgets, optimal interventions are simple-they essentially involve only a single principal component.